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COMMENT
The Impact of U.S. Regulatory Activity on Prospects
for Implementation of the WTO Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications
I. Introduction
For much of the twentieth century the worldwide
telecommunications industry has remained a bastion of
monopolistic behavior.' However, the rapid technological
advances of the current decade have served as a catalyst for change
of the economic model from government-sanctioned monopoly to
pro-competitive open markets The digital information age has
transformed communications into the primary component linking
the economies of the world.3 Information superhighways have
emerged as the circulatory system of international economic
growth.4 Beginning with the 1994 call by Vice President Albert
Gore for the nations of the world to join in building a Global
Information Infrastructure, the international telecommunications
industry has worked to achieve the goals inherent in such an
effort-increased competition and independent regulation.' As a
result, the World Trade Organization (WTO) reached a historic
agreement in February 1997 to open nearly ninety percent of
global telecommunications services revenues to competition by
1998.6
1 See Alan Cane, Innovation Key in Fight for Survival, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 11052670.
2 See FCC Chairman Reed E. Hundt, From Buenos Aires to Geneva and Beyond,
Address Before the World Affairs Council (Oct. 22, 1997) (visited Oct. 26, 1997)
<http://www.fcc.gov/speeches/hundt/spreh759.html>.
' See id.
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 See Cane, supra note 1. Basic telecommunications services are a $600 billion
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The WTO Agreement's goal of opening foreign markets to all
competitors has long been a major part of U.S. trade policy.7
During the three years of debate over the WTO Agreement, the
United States led the lobby for other countries to adopt principles
of independent and transparent telecommunications regulation.8
However, recent activities of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) have led many to question the U.S.
commitment to the underlying principles of the Agreement.9
This Comment will examine the role of the FCC in influencing
international trade policy following the WTO Agreement, focusing
on three recent FCC actions that offer insight into U.S. strategy for
participation in the global telecommunications arena under the
WTO accord. Section II begins by outlining the evolution of the
international telecommunications marketplace, culminating with
the 1997 WTO Agreement. ° The section then describes the
regulatory history of international telecommunications in the
United States leading up to the WTO Agreement." Section III
examines the U.S. reaction to the WTO Agreement in light of its
goal of market liberalization. Specifically, the impact of the
following actions will be analyzed: (1) the agency's relationship
with the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
in bilateral trade dealings with Japan; 2 (2) the adoption of
benchmark settlement rates by the FCC in August 1997; 3 and (3)
the Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S.
Telecommunications Market issued by the FCC in November
1997 which adopts the rules necessary for the United States to
per year industry, which includes voice telephony, data transmission, facsimile services,
fixed and mobile satellite services, paging, and personal communications services. See
John L. Harwood II et al., Competition in International Telecommunications Services,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 874, 884 (1997).
7 See Kenneth Robinson, Telecom as Trade Tool: Small Minds at Work, TR
INT'L, Oct. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12641482.
8 See id.
9 See Michael Smith, U.S. Warned over WTO Telecom Rules, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1997, available in 1997 WL 11046017.
'0 See infra notes 15-84 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 85-132 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 133-66 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 167-240 and accompanying text.
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comply with the WTO Agreement. 14
While each of these actions includes an explicit concession to
multilateral efforts for liberalizing international
telecommunications markets, they also contain strong bilateral
elements. These elements play a key role both in achieving
specific tactical goals and in encouraging other countries to
embrace a pro-competitive agenda. While more overt bilateral
pressure will be restricted to non-WTO countries following the
implementation of the Agreement, an analysis of the above U.S.
actions reveals implicit bilateral tools that are both necessary to
achieve U.S. objectives of a competitive global
telecommunications market and compatible with the multilateral
focus of the WTO Agreement.
II. Background: The Evolution of a Competitive
Environment
A. International Telecommunications Industry-Historical
Perspective
Traditionally, most telecommunications operators were owned
and controlled by their respective governments which, in turn,
protected them as strategic national assets. 5  More recently,
however, privatization has occurred. 6 The United States and the
United Kingdom led the movement toward market liberalization,
followed closely by other members of the European Union. 7 In
14 See infra notes 241-328 and accompanying text.
15 See Cane, supra note 1.
16 See id.
17 See Peter Sisson, The New WTO Telecom Agreement: Opportunities and
Challenges, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, Sept. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9774398. The
European Union countries had a pre-existing plan to open their telecommunications
markets in January 1998. See id. The United States argues that the enactment of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ushered in a new era of domestic communications
competition and deregulatory communications policy. See Hundt, supra note 2. The
Act, which opened previously closed local telephone monopolies to new carriers, was
called "the world's gold standard for pro-competitive deregulation" by FCC Chairman
Hundt in a June 1997 statement. Id.; FCC Chairman Reed E. Hundt, Statement on
Commission Proceeding to Review Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the
U.S. Telecommunications Market (June 4, 1997) (visited Oct. 26, 1997)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/st970604.html>.
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addition, U.S. multinational corporations, which are among the
heaviest consumers of international telecommunications services,
have advocated the introduction of competition in the basic
services market to stimulate lower prices and increased service
offerings. "
The significant role that the global telecommunications
infrastructure plays in the digital information age prompted these
changes.' 9 In March 1994, Vice President Albert Gore announced
an initiative to promote the development of a Global Information
Infrastructure (GII) that would be guided by principles of private
investment, competition, open access to world markets, flexible
regulation and universal services. 0 The recent revolution in
information technology has been compared to the Industrial
Revolution in its impact on almost every aspect of daily life."2
Like its industrial counterpart, the infrastructure demands of a
global telecommunication network require significant capital
investment. 22  No longer able to depend on national government
funding, countries have been forced to alter their policies to
embrace competition in order to attract private investment.
2 1
In reaction to the changing face of the global
telecommunications industry, delegates commenced efforts to
liberalize the telecommunications market during the Uruguay
18 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 874.
19 See Hundt, supra note 2.
20 See Vice President Albert Gore, Remarks at the Meeting of the International
Telecommunications Union (Mar. 21, 1994) (visited Nov. 22, 1997).
<http://www.iitf.nist.gov/documents/speeches/032194-goregiispeech.html>.
21 See Hundt, supra note 2. Vice President Gore, in his promotion of the GII,
spoke of a planetary network that would transmit messages and images around the globe
at the speed of light, circling the planet with information superhighways connecting a
global community. See Gore, supra note 20.
22 See Hundt, supra note 2. The magnitude of the required investment is
exemplified by the fact that about 45 countries currently have less than one telephone
line per 100 inhabitants. See id. More than half the people on the planet have never
made a telephone call. See id. It is estimated that billions of dollars will be required to
build out the underdeveloped infrastructures that exist. See id.
23 See id. Private sources only financed about 20% of the telecommunications
infrastructure in developing countries in the early 1990s. See id. The World Bank
estimates that by the year 2000, private lending will account for about 55% of such
infrastructure financing. See id.
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Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).24
GATT, which has long focused on international trade in goods,
responded to the growing movement to open world markets to
international service providers by enacting a multilateral
agreement, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),
in December 1993.25
Some of the principles enacted under the GATS pertain to
services generally, while others pertain specifically to
telecommunications. 26 Regarding services generally, each country
participating in the GATS files a schedule of commitments
denoting the particular services to which it will apply the GATS
principles.27  Unless a signatory country claims specific
exemptions in its schedule, the general service principles demand
most favored nation treatment for the service providers from that
country.28 Also, the GATS general principles require national
treatment and compliance with specific market access provisions
that are designed to prohibit certain discriminatory practices (such
as limitations on foreign capital investment) against foreign
service providers. 29  These provisions attempt to eliminate
discrimination among service providers based solely on
nationality.
Those principles related specifically to telecommunications are
included in the Annex on Telecommunications which is a
supplement to the GATS.3" The Annex expands the GATS
objectives to the specific area of public telecommunications
network access. 2  The Annex outlines principles for future
telecommunications market liberalization, including "a provision
calling for access to and use of the public network on reasonable,
24 See Sisson, supra note 17.
25 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 879.
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id. Again, these principles are subject to conditions and limitations
contained in an individual country's schedules. See id.
30 See id. at 879-80.
3' See id. at 880.
32 See id.
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nondiscriminatory terms and conditions."33 However, the scope of
the telecommunications provisions under GATS and the Annex is
34limited and does not directly address basic services.
B. 1997 WTO Multinational Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications
Basic telecommunications services account for the majority of
telecommunications revenues worldwide.35 Provision of these
services requires an extensive network of facilities that have
traditionally been controlled by government-run monopolies.36
Market liberalization in this area presents political as well as
economic and technological challenges and, for these reasons, has
proven particularly difficult to accomplish.37
1. The GATS Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications
Services
The GATS negotiators were unable to reach agreement on
basic telecommunications services following extensive discussions
during the Uruguay Round.: The parties instead drafted a
ministerial "Decision on Negotiations on Basic
Telecommunications" in which the signatories agreed to complete
negotiations through a Negotiating Group on Basic
Telecommunications (NGBT) and to submit a report by April 30,
1996. 39 In the negotiations that followed, the United States offered
33 MORTON I. HAMBURG & STUART N. BROTMAN, COMMUNICATIONS LAW AND
PRACTICE 7-23 (1997).
31 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 880. The scope of the commitments made in
schedules by individual countries determines the impact of the agreement. See id. As
long as a country's restrictions on competition do not discriminate among foreign
providers on the basis of nationality, most favored nation (MFN) treatment is not
violated. See id. The national treatment and market access provisions apply only to
services that a country has listed on its schedule. See id. Only providers of scheduled
services receive access to public telecommunications networks. See id.
31 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 881.
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 See id. at 882.
39 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
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to open all of its basic telecommunications service markets to
entry from other signatories. 40 This offer was contingent upon a
number of the other participating countries making sufficient
commitments to open markets. 4' However, after concluding that
too few countries had made adequate offers, the United States
withdrew its offer as the April deadline approached.42
The United States viewed its telecommunications market as
considerably more liberalized than those of the other participants.
Its decision to withdraw its offer to the NGBT reflected its
position that the most favored nation commitments by countries
that allowed monopolies in basic services were meaningless.43
Major U.S. telecommunications vendors opposed the NGBT deal
because of their belief that the existing offers were inadequate to
assure the U.S. firms would gain access to foreign markets." The
WTO saved the NGBT negotiations by extending the deadline to
February 15, 1997. 45
2. The Resulting WTO Agreement
On February 15, 1997, sixty-nine countries, including the
United States and most of its major trading partners, agreed to
open markets for basic telecommunications services by January 1,
1998.46 The WTO Agreement covers ninety-five percent of the
$600 billion international market for such services. 47 Sixty-five of
the countries, including the United States, further pledged to
permit competition in the basic voice telephony arena by agreeing
ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1192-96 (1994).
40 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 882.
41 See id.
42 See id.
41 See id. at 882-83.
4 See id. at 883.
41 See id.
46 See Commission Initiates Proceeding to Review Rules and Policies on Foreign
Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market (visited Oct. 12, 1997)
<http://www.fcc.gov/bureaus/intemational/newsreleases/1997/nrin7019.html>
[hereinafter IN 97-15].
47 See Hundt, supra note 2. By contrast, the April 30, 1996 offers included 48
countries and accounted for about 60% of the global market. See Harwood, supra note
6, at 883.
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to a document containing a binding, enforceable set of competition
rules48 to be enforced through the WTO's dispute settlement
• 49
mechanism. "[S]ixty-nine [countries] made offers on foreign
investment with forty-eight allowing full private investment. 
50
Finally, with respect to market access for satellite services and
facilities, fifty-two countries made offers of full guaranteed
domestic and international access and seven others guaranteed
access for selected satellite services and facilities .
The new opportunities for global competition created by the
Agreement excited industry leaders. 2 Delegates attending the
Global Networking Conference in June 1997 in Calgary, Alberta
heard speakers proclaim the death of the "old order" of centrally
directed monopolies in telecommunications services and a new era
of liberalization under the WTO Agreement. 3 While delegates
from around the world celebrated the promise that new
telecommunications technologies would enhance economic growth
in their countries, many also anticipated incremental rather than
revolutionary implementation. 4  Yet, Gerald Taylor, chief
executive of MCI, recognized the shift in attitude toward
deregulation and called passage of the Agreement a "defining
event."55  Taylor's excitement reflected his belief that the new
competitive safeguards would "increase his company's odds when
48 See IN 97-15, supra note 46. The telecommunications industry rules contained
in the Reference Paper on Pro-Competitive Regulatory Principles include those
governing fair and economical interconnection guarantees, prohibitions on
anticompetitive conduct, and independent industry regulation. See id. The rules are
based on the principles found in the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996. See id.
49 See id.; see also Vineeta Shetty, Win some, lose more (World Trade
Organization Agreement), COMM. INT'L, Apr. 1997, available in 1997 WL 9942182
(noting that the Agreement marks the first time that any of the sixty five countries have
allowed common competition rules in their markets to be enforced through the WTO's
dispute settlement mechanism).
50 Hundt, supra note 2.
5' See id.
52 See Sisson, supra note 17.
53 See At Global Conference, World Embraces Challenge of Liberalization, WTO
Pact, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPS, June 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7757893.
14 See id.
55 Sisson, supra note 17.
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challenging entrenched" operators in formerly protected markets. 6
The Agreement, which has been called the most visible
achievement of the WTO to date, represents a major victory for
the United States in its efforts to open the international
telecommunications market to competition. 7  Participating
countries were obligated to ratify the Agreement by November 30,
1997 and to draft clearer competition rules ensuring fair
competition through regulatory oversight. 8  At the November
deadline, twenty signatories had failed to formally ratify the
Agreement, which caused squabbling among WTO delegates
concerning the Agreement's entry-into-force date.59
At a December 1997 meeting of the signatories, the deadline
for ratification was extended until July 31, 1998, and entry of the
Agreement into force, originally slated for January 1, 1998, was
delayed. 6° On four separate occasions during December 1997 and
January 1998, the United States single-handedly delayed
implementation in a move to apply pressure on some of the then
twenty signatories who had not yet ratified the Agreement.
61
Since the November 30, 1997 deadline, seven additional
countries have sent formal notification of their ratification to the
WTO, bringing the total to fifty-seven by the January 26, 1998
meeting of the signatories.62
Citing the widely held belief that no country has reconsidered
its decision to sign the Agreement, the United States reversed its
56 Id.
57 See id.; Harwood, supra note 6, at 884.
5' See Erik W. Schmidt, Other International Issues: International
Telecommunications Transactions: A Critique of the FCC's "Effective Competitive
Opportunities" Analysis, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 629, 646 (1997). The rulemaking
notice, analyzed in-depth infra at Part 1Il.B, is the U.S. effort to amend its rules because
of the commitments made by the signatories of the WTO agreement. See infra text
accompanying notes 241-327.
59 See WTO Sets Feb. 5 Date For Trade Agreement, TR INT'L, Jan. 30, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 9762352.
6 See id.
61 See id.
62 See FCC Prepares For A More Open Global Telecommunications Market,
COMM. TODAY, Jan. 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5264340; WTO Sets Feb. 5 Date
For Trade Agreement, supra note 59.
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earlier position and, at the January 26 meeting, agreed with the
other WTO members that the Agreement would take effect on
February 5, 1998.63 U.S. Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky released a statement following the January 26 meeting
in which she noted that, although the thirteen laggard countries
represent only four percent of the global telecommunications
services market, it is essential that all parties to the Agreement
formally obligate themselves. 4 The United States emphatically
stated that it will continue to pursue ratification with the thirteen
outlying countries in both bilateral sessions and future WTO
• 61
meetings. It remains unclear how the United States will respond
in the interim regarding its obligations under the Agreement to
•• 66
those countries that have not yet ratified.
Implementation of the Agreement is anticipated to provide
ongoing challenges since many countries made pledges that phase
in gradually or are less sweeping than those of other signatories.67
The impact, however, is expected to be significant. 68 According to
an estimate from the Office of the USTR, those countries granting
market access under the auspices of the Agreement account for
ninety-nine percent of the total basic international
telecommunications services revenues of all WTO member
countries. 69
63 See WTO Members Agree Telecom Act Will Become Effective Next Month,
COMM. TODAY, Jan. 27, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5264523.
6 See With 57 Countries On Board, WTO Picks Feb. 5 Telecom Pact Start Date,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPS, Feb. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8485563.
65 See WTO Sets Feb. 5 Date For Trade Agreement, supra note 59. The 13
countries that have not yet signed the Agreement are Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Papua New
Guinea, the Philippines, Poland, and Romania. See id. Most of the 13 outlier countries
appear to have run into timing issues in completing the necessary domestic legislative,
executive, and/or regulatory procedures. See id. A U.S. trade official emphasized that
the governments of those countries in the southern hemisphere are on vacation at this
time of year. See id.
66 See id.
67 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 883.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 883-84.
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3. Implications of the WTO Agreement
Increased opportunity for truly integrated global marketing
strategies will be a major implication of the Agreement.70  The
chief effects of such strategies will result from international
branding,7' including one-stop shopping for seamless worldwide
service at consistent prices.72 This is of particular importance to
large multinational corporations that currently must deal with
multiple providers of basic telecommunications services around
the world.73
Another important implication of the Agreement is the promise
of improved dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms. 4
The aim of the WTO dispute resolution process is to ensure the
current goals and to prevent retrogression.75 Effective and timely
dispute resolution is expected to reduce the risks of investing
abroad and, thereby, promote a much-needed acceleration in the
76pace of such investment. A key aspect of this dispute resolution
process is the replacement of bilateral agreements with a legally
enforceable, multilateral Agreement to be upheld by the World
Court.77 In addition, complaints will be handled by an independent
WTO panel empowered to enact binding resolutions and impose
penalties, including unilateral trade sanctions 7
70 See Sisson, supra note 17.
71 Branding is a marketing effort directed toward distinguishing a product for its
completion. See, e.g., Louis E. BOONE & DAVID L. KURTZ, CONTEMPORARY
MARKETING, 185 (1974). The focus of international branding is the building of global
awareness of a product's image and the development of quality associations that allow
consumers to readily identify the product for repeat purchases. See id.
72 See Sisson, supra note 17.
71 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 875. Because these services vary widely in
technical capabilities, incompatibilities often result. See id. In addition, the
multinationals must comply with various regulatory schemes and pay their bills in
numerous currencies. See id.
74 See Sisson, supra note 17.
75 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 884.
76 See Sisson, supra note 17.
77 See id. The Agreement requires most favored nation treatment for all
participating countries and national treatment for all foreign carriers entering a market.
See id.
78 See id. at 17. Several concerns remain, however, that to some extent diminish
1998]
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Perhaps the most controversial implication of the Agreement
concerns the fallout from increased competition resulting from
deregulation.7 9 While telecommunications providers will require
more funds to expand their service offerings, price competition
will lead to smaller margins and thus lower profits and will
seriously threaten inefficient operators. ° The most vulnerable
segment will be the international long-distance market which,
because of high tariffs and traffic imbalances, has produced the
income traditionally used to subsidize inefficient operators."' An
important harbinger of this expected outcome is the recent
adoption by the United States of international settlement rate
benchmarks.82  This action has led to global outcry.83  The
implications will be analyzed in Part III.B of this Comment.84
C. Regulatory History of International Telecommunications
in the United States
Prior to the conclusion of the GATS, U.S. trade related to
international telecommunications services was limited primarily to
bilateral agreements.85 The FCC's policy of increasing domestic
deregulation over the past two decades served as an impetus for
multilateral liberalization. As the size and relative openness of
confidence in the effectiveness of the proposed dispute resolution process. See id.
Critics point to the ineffectiveness of an early 1997 WTO panel in resolving an
international dispute over the Helms-Burton law. See id. In addition, since the WTO
dispute resolution process handles only international trade disputes brought by
governments rather than foreign operators, there is concern that access to the WTO
forum will not be easily and quickly available. See id. Finally, the domestic
implementation of the Agreement is likely to present significant challenges, both
financially and politically, as countries must change their laws to comply with the
regulatory changes inherent in the Agreement. See id.
79 See id.
80 See id.
"I See id.
82 See FCC Puts Pin to International Settlement Bubble; Action Draws Fire As
Protectionist, COMM. RESALE REP., Aug. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8808689.
83 See id.
84 See note 167-240 and accompanying text.
85 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 879.
86 See id. at 875.
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the U.S. market attracted an increasing number of foreign carriers,
domestic carriers became concerned that foreign market
opportunities remained unavailable to them.87 They began to
pressure the FCC to use its regulatory authority to encourage
international market liberalization, which they hoped would
increase competitiveness."
1. Communications Act of 1934
The FCC historically has exercised authority to regulate
foreign investment in the U.S. telecommunications industry under
two provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 (the 1934
Act).s9 Both provisions contain an evaluation of the public interest
impact of the proposed investment that is given considerable
weight in the FCC's ultimate determination. 90
Section 214 of the 1934 Act deals directly with a foreign
carrier's entry into the U.S. services market by acquisition or
operation of a telecommunications line.9' It requires a foreign
carrier investing in a U.S. carrier to obtain FCC approval because,
as a consequence of the investment, the foreign carrier would in
92effect acquire and/or operate a line. Approval consists of a
certificate granted by the FCC after the foreign carrier successfully
passed a public convenience and necessity test.93
Companies using radio technology to offer common carrier,
broadcast, or aeronautical services fall within section 310.
94
87 See id.
88 See id. at 874.
89 See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
90 See id. §§ 214(a), 3 10(b).
9' See id. § 214(a).
No carrier shall undertake the construction of a new line or of an extension
of any line, or shall acquire or operate any line, or extension thereof, or
shall engage in transmission over or by means of such additional or
extended line, unless and until there shall first have been obtained from the
Commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience and
necessity require or will require the construction and operation of such
additional or extended line ....
92 See id.
" See id.; see also supra note 91 and accompanying text.
94 See id. § 310(b).
1998]
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Telecommunications companies, including most telephone
companies, are~included in this regulation because they use radio,
satellite, or microwave links in their networks and, thus, require an
FCC-issued radio license.9  Section 310 limits the ability of
foreign entities to hold certain FCC licenses by restricting foreign
investment in those U.S. companies holding such licenses.96
Specifically, section 310(b) limits total foreign ownership and the
number of foreign directors to twenty-five percent and prohibits
foreign officers.97 Requests to exceed these restrictions are subject
to examination on a case-by-case basis by the FCC considering the
public interest effect of the licensing. 98
a. Foreign Carrier Entry Order
On November 30, 1995, the FCC issued the Foreign Carrier
Entry Order which explicitly stated its intention to use the FCC's
regulatory power over the world's largest telecommunications
services market as leverage to bilaterally negotiate
telecommunications market access concessions from foreign
No broadcast or common carrier or aeronautical en route or aeronautical
fixed radio station shall be granted to or held by -
(1) any alien or the representative of any alien;
(2) any corporation organized under the laws of any foreign government;
(3) any corporation of which any officer or director is an alien or of which
more than one-fifth of the capital stock is owned of record or voted by
aliens or their representatives or by a foreign government or representative
thereof or by any corporation organized under the laws of a foreign
country;
(4) any corporation directly or indirectly controlled by any other
corporation of which any officer or more than one-fourth of the directors
are aliens, or of which more than one-fourth of the capital stock is owned
of record or voted by aliens, their representatives, or by a foreign
government or representative thereof, or by any corporation organized
under the laws of a foreign country, if the Commission finds that the public
interest will be served by the refusal or revocation of such license.
9 See Schmidt, supra note 58, at 630 n.3.
96 See id. at 630.
97 See id.; see also Veronica M. Ahern, Developments in the International
Marketplace, 427 PLI/PAT 273, 303 (1995) (noting that these limits represent
"benchmarks" only).
98 See Ahren, supra note 97, at 303.
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countries." Through this Order, in January 1996, the FCC
incorporated an "effective competitive opportunities" (ECO)
analysis into the public interest calculus utilized in sections 214
and 310.'°° The ECO test, which is "loosely based on the principle
of reciprocity," involves a determination of whether U.S. carriers
have "equivalent" market opportunities in the domestic market of
a foreign carrier "seeking to operate in the United States."'' The
FCC utilizes the ECO test whenever foreign carriers and their
affiliates seek authorization to provide U.S. international facilities-
based service under section 214 and also when foreign entities
seek to obtain an indirect ownership interest of more than twenty-
five percent in a U.S. radio licensee under section 310(b). °2
Once a section 214 review is initiated, the analysis examines
whether "effective competitive opportunities" exist for U.S.
carriers in the relevant "destination markets."°. If the ECO
9 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 885.
'o See In the Matter of Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities
(Foreign Carrier Entry Order), 11 F.C.C.R. 3873, 3875-76 (1996) [hereinafter FCC 95-
475].
'' FCC Moves to Implement WTO Agreement, Proposes Easy Market Entry for
Foreign Carriers, COMM. RESALE REP., June 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8808641.
102 See id.
'0' See FCC 95-475, supra note 100, at 3917; see also FCC Moves to Implement
WTO Agreement, Proposes Easy Market Entry for Foreign Carriers, supra note 101.
Destination markets are those markets where the foreign carrier is capable of exercising
market power. See id.
There are six factors in the ECO analysis:
(1) whether U.S. carriers can offer in the foreign country international
facilities-based services substantially similar to those that the foreign
carrier seeks to offer in the United States;
(2) whether competitive safeguards exist in the foreign country to protect
against anticompetitive and discriminatory practices... ;
(3) the availability of published, nondiscriminatory charges, terms and
conditions for interconnection to foreign domestic carriers' facilities for
termination and origination of international services;
(4) timely and nondiscriminatory disclosure of technical information needed
to use or interconnect with carriers' facilities;
(5) the protection of carrier and customer proprietary information; and
(6) whether an independent regulatory body with fair and transparent
procedures is established to enforce competitive safeguards.
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requirement is satisfied, the FCC will permit the foreign carrier to
enter the U.S. international services market.'°'
The reasoning behind the ECO analysis under section 310
flows from the "public interest" determination required of the FCC
when analyzing requests for new market entry representing a more
than twenty-five percent indirect foreign ownership.' 5 A section
310 ECO analysis is limited to common carrier radio licenses and
follows the same multi-step analysis as that under a section 214
review, except that the focus is on home markets rather than
destination markets.' °6 According to the FCC, the ECO test is
satisfied if "U.S. companies can acquire a controlling interest in
the home market of a foreign investor."'0 7
It is important to note that the ECO analysis under either
section 214 or 310 is not dispositive. Additional public interest
factors may be used to outweigh the results of the ECO test.' 8
These factors assess the significance of the proposed entry by the
foreign entity on competition in the U.S. telecommunications
market, along with any national security, law enforcement, foreign
policy or trade considerations raised by the executive branch.
The first FCC application following adoption of the ECO test-the
Sprint case-revealed the breadth of discretion available to the
FCC via the public interest analysis. "0
b. The Sprint Case - Initial Application of the ECO
Test
In June 1995, Sprint, Deutsche Telekom, and France Telecom
agreed to the terms by which Deutsche Telekom and France
Telecom would purchase a twenty percent equity investment in
Sprint."' This proposed investment provided the FCC its first
FCC 95-475, supra note 100, at 3889.
'04 See id.
'o' See id. at 3943.
106 See id. at 3954.
107 Id.
'08 See Schmidt, supra note 58, at 663.
1'9 See FCC 95-475, supra note 100, at 3955.
'1o See In re Sprint Corp., 11 F.C.C.R. 1850, 1850 (1996).
See Schmidt, supra note 58, at 636.
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opportunity to apply the ECO analysis, which had been adopted
only seventeen days before the final ruling in Sprint."' Despite a
finding that no competitive opportunities existed in Germany or
France, the FCC nevertheless approved the investment based on its
beneficial effect on U.S. competition."3
Following completion of the section 214 analysis, the FCC
concluded that effective competitive opportunities did not exist in
this transaction because U.S. carriers were legally prohibited from
entering the French and German international telecommunications
markets because of de jure monopolies in both countries." 4
Further, the FCC chose not to consider a section 310 ECO analysis
both because it had already made a determinative finding under
section 214 that effective competitive opportunities did not exist
and, more importantly, because it had approved the transaction
based on public interest factors."'.
The FCC stated two factors it considered significant in
approving the transaction. First, the large capital infusion into the
third largest carrier in the U.S. market would allow Sprint to meet
capital requirements for future expansion with the goal of
increased competitiveness. ' 16  Second, because of impending
European Union and national legislation obligating both Germany
and France to full liberalization of their markets, the United States
received assurance that both nations would open their respective
telecommunications markets before 1998.11
Moreover, the FCC approved the transaction with a condition:
Restrictions on market power abuses were implemented and were
to remain effective until full facilities and services competition
112 See id.
"1 See id.; In re Sprint Corp., 11 F.C.C.R. at 1850.
11 See Schmidt, supra note 58, at 637. A section 214 analysis was technically not
required because the investment did not meet the 25% requirement for affiliation;
however, the FCC chose to apply the analysis because of the size of the two foreign
investors. See id.
" See id. Sprint sought the section 310 approval because of its expected aggregate
percentage of foreign ownership. See id.
116 See id.
117 See id.
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were instituted in both France and Germany. 118
The indeterminate outcome of Sprint and those applications
which followed it have generated concern in the industry. It has
been suggested that as a result of the agency's actions in Sprint,
the FCC policies would ultimately discourage foreign investment
in the U.S. market-a result seemingly at odds with the FCC's
stated objectives."9 Although the Order states that the FCC is not
imposing a reciprocity standard with the ECO test, its application
has become universally unpopular with foreign carriers and
governments over the past two years. 2 ° In particular, the public
interest factors, considered by many as broad and unclear, have
proven potent weapons in bilateral trade negotiations.' Thus,
while the ECO test has received credit for its effectiveness in
encouraging liberalization in foreign markets, its almost total
demise in light of the WTO Agreement has been cause for
considerable celebration.'22
2. Telecommunications Act of 1996
Widely recognized as the model for the Reference Paper on
Pro-Competitive Regulatory Principles adopted by sixty-five of
the countries bound to the WTO Agreement,'23  the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act) was the first
significant overhaul of the U.S. domestic telecommunications
... See id. at 637-39. Specifically, the FCC ruled that it would not authorize Sprint
to operate additional circuits on U.S.-France and U.S.-German routes until France and
Germany allow the provision of (1) alternative infrastructure for already liberalized
services (which include most non-public voice services) and (2) basic switched voice
resale. See id. The FCC also required Sprint to obtain a written commitment from
France Telecom to lower the accounting rate between the United States and France to
the same range as the U.S.-U.K. and U.S.-Germany rates. See id. Finally, the FCC
stated that, if France and Germany fail to implement their planned liberalization
measures by the spring of 1998, the FCC will revisit its approval of the alliance. See id.
"9 See id. at 649.
120 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 885.
121 See European Commission: FCC Breached WTO in Market-Entry Proposals,
TR DAILY, Aug. 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7144361.
122 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 885; see also infra notes 268-70 and
accompanying text (discussing market reaction to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
FCC 97-398, which eliminated most usages of the ECO test).
123 See IN 97-15, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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regulatory regime in over sixty years. 124 In his speech before the
World Affairs Council in October 1997, then-Chair Hundt stated
that the Act showcased "a pro-competitive, deregulatory
communications policy and opened previously closed local
telephone monopolies to new entrants. ' 25
The 1996 Act's practices and standards for interconnections,
unbundling of services and universal service have served as
models for countries around the world. 126 More importantly, the
Act's refusal to regulate the Internet was intended to state the U.S.
commitment to promote economic growth and innovation
throughout the world by encouraging competition.
127
The Act makes two important changes to the Communications
Act of 1934 as it relates to foreign investment."8 First, the 1996
Act discharges the ban on foreign nationals serving as officers or
directors of a common carrier licensee or its holding company.129
The Act also directs state and local governments to open local
markets to competition from both domestic carriers and those
telecommunications companies with partial foreign ownership.
30
The 1996 Act has proven difficult to enforce, however, and
competition in the local markets has not fully opened to long
distance carriers as the Act intended. 131 Such domestic difficulties
have prompted critics of the WTO Agreement to voice concern
regarding the chances for successful international progress.'1
3 2
Il. Analysis: U.S. Actions Following the WTO Agreement
This Comment argues that recent FCC actions, in anticipation
of implementation of the WTO Agreement, define dual strategies
regarding international deregulation of basic telecommunications
124 See Hundt, supra note 2.
125 Id.
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See Schmidt, supra note 58, at 633.
129 See id.
'130 See id.
131 See Cane, supra note 1.
132 See id.
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services-adherence to standards of market liberalization coupled
with protection of competition in U.S. markets. Each of the three
agency actions analyzed-the FCC interrelationship with the
USTR as exemplified in trade dealings with Japan, the unilateral
adoption of benchmark settlement rates and, most importantly, the
rules adopted for regulatory compliance with the WTO Agreement
itself-will be shown to contain elements supportive of each
strategy. The analysis further shows, despite public criticism to
the contrary, not only the compatibility of these strategies but also
their necessity in ensuring that the overall objectives of the WTO
Agreement are met.
A. The FCC Interrelationship with the USTR in Trade
Negotiations
Much of the dissatisfaction of foreign carriers and
governments regarding the ECO test for entry into the U.S.
market 133 stems not from the requirement for effective competitive
opportunities within their home markets but rather from the
associated public interest factors that may be used to outweigh the
results of the ECO test. 134 These factors assess the significance of
the proposed foreign entry on competition in the U.S. market,
along with any national security, law enforcement, foreign policy
or trade considerations raised by the executive branch.'35 To many
foreign investors they represent vague standards that may be
arbitrarily used to deny access to the U.S. market.'36 Of particular
concern is the power of the USTR to influence FCC licensing
decisions as leverage in unrelated trade negotiations-as the
following situation exemplifies.'37
Two Japanese telecommunications companies have only
recently emerged from a regulatory limbo that resulted from a
long-standing squabble with the Office of the USTR."3  Both
133 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
134 See Foreign Carriers Want FCC's ECO to Fade Away, TR INT'L, July 18, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 9319703.
"31 See FCC 95-475, supra note 100, at 3955.
136 See Foreign Carriers Want FCC's ECO to Fade Away, supra note 134.
137 See Robinson, supra note 7.
138 See U.S., Japan in Trade Talks on Procurement, Ownership; FCC to Move on
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Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. (NTT) and Kokusai
Denshin Denwa Co. Ltd. (KDD) were notified in March 1997 that
their applications to enter the U.S. market would be stalled
pending resolution of U.S. trade concerns.'3 9 An interagency group
composed of officials from the Office of the USTR and other
executive branch agencies requested that the FCC take no action
on the applications.' 4°  The USTR cited issues involving the
continuing Japanese limits on foreign ownership of NTT and KDD
and the renegotiation of an equipment procurement contract for
NTT.'
41
The executive branch agencies expected the pressure created
from the stalled applications to facilitate ongoing talks with the
Japanese government over the procurement situation. 142 While the
FCC normally would have accepted the applications from the
Japanese carriers and put them on public notice for comment from
other entities, the executive branch's formal request may have left
the FCC little choice but to comply. 143 For its part, the USTR
recognized the advantage of one agency withholding a key
bargaining chip while another agency holds negotiations on an
unrelated matter.14
The USTR also could have launched 301 sanctions to deal
with recalcitrance of the Japanese in extending the procurement
pact. 14 This process, however, takes a considerable amount of
time and bureaucratic effort. 46 The FCC action, in contrast, was
both swift and easily accomplished. 47 Furthermore, challenges to
an FCC action must occur in the judicial system and quick
KDD, NTT Requests, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REP., Sept. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL
7758623.
139 See Robinson, supra note 7.
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 See id.
141 See id.
'44 See id.
141 See id.
146 See id.
147 See id.
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resolution is rare.148 One former USTR official likened using FCC
action to address unfair trade practices abroad to "a 301 without
the pain."'
49
Although Japanese officials threatened to complain to the
WTO about U.S. tactics, the USTR pressure eventually resulted in
an agreement between the two countries to resume negotiations. 5 0
On September 8, 1997, the interagency group sent a letter to the
FCC officially withdrawing its request to stall the Japanese
applications.' That action fulfilled a condition the Japanese had
set before they would agree to proceed with the trade talks.
5 2
Thus, on September 8, the United States and Japan announced
their agreement to begin formal negotiations to extend the pact
governing procurement of U.S. telecommunications equipment by
NTT. '53 Japan also agreed to address the issue of foreign
investment in NTT and KDD, an issue much debated during and
after the WTO Agreement was reached. 1 4  The FCC then
announced that it would resume processing the applications, and
on September 11, 1997, it issued a public notice indicating that
two of the applications filed by KDD had been granted. 5
One industry expert called this FCC action the "most obvious
use by U.S. trade authorities of the FCC as a trade policy tool
since the telecommunications market-opening effort began."' 5
6
Although the use of the FCC approval process as a convenient
weapon to achieve trade objectives was not without tactical
148 See id.
149 Id.
150 See Helene Cooper, FCC to Delay Japanese Firms' License Request, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL-WSJ 2413206; see also U.S., Japan in Trade
Talks on Procurement, Ownership; FCC to Move on KDD, NTT Requests, supra note
138.
151 See U.S., Japan in Trade Talks on Procurement, Ownership; FCC to Move on
KDD, NTT Requests, supra note 138.
152 See id.
13 See id.
'14 See id. Japan's exemption of both NTT and KDD from their commitment to
allow up to 100% foreign ownership remains a problem for the United States. See id.
'55 See id.
56 Robinson, supra note 7.
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logic,'57 it raised questions about the U.S. commitment to market
deregulation on the eve of implementation of the WTO
Agreement. ,58
One of the primary objectives of the WTO Agreement-and
the one most zealously promoted by the United States-has been
independent regulation.' 9 Throughout the years of negotiations on
the Agreement, the United States consistently pressured its trading
partners to adopt regulatory structures and standards insulated
from commercial and political pressures."6  While it might be
more convenient to achieve particular tactical goals outside the
accepted regimen, to do so certainly risks inducing comparable
action abroad. 161  In order to remain faithful to the goals
established by the WTO Agreement, some would argue that the
United States should refrain from seeking such tactical advantages,
particularly when the measures are chosen more for expediency
than for ultimate outcome.
162
On the other hand, an argument could be made that the U.S.
action was, in fact, supportive of the underlying goals of the WTO
Agreement in that the pressure exerted by the United States
resulted in a promise by Japan to address concerns specifically
related to the implementation of the Agreement. The Clinton
administration was clearly concerned that Japan did not make
enough concessions during the negotiation of Agreement. 163 While
the equipment procurement issue was outside the scope of the
Agreement, it nevertheless has direct bearing on the
telecommunications market liberalization effort.' 64 Moreover, the
157 See id.
158 See id. This concern is particularly relevant in light of the continued utilization
of the public interest test in the newly issued FCC rules governing implementation of the
WTO Agreement. See infra notes 268-75 and accompanying text.
159 See Hundt, supra note 2.
"6 See Robinson, supra note 7.
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 See Cooper, supra note 150.
16 See id. Under the expiring pact, Japan had pledged to boost the transparency of
KDD's procurement policies. See id. The U.S. objective has been to ensure that U.S.
suppliers have fair access to compete for NTT's sizable procurement contracts. See
U.S., Japan Come to Terms On Telecom Trade Issues, TR INT'L, Sept. 12, 1997,
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issue of foreign investment in NTT and KDD is directly relevant
to the successful implementation of the Agreement. 65 The United
States was disgruntled that Japan refused to remove rules limiting
foreign ownership of the two companies to twenty-five percent; by
contrast, under the WTO pact, Japanese companies will be eligible
to buy one hundred percent of some U.S. carriers. 166 Thus, the
success of the FCC's bilateral action in achieving some movement
by Japan on this issue is not entirely inconsistent with the goals
established by the Agreement.
B. International Settlement Rates
One of the ways in which the United States plans to safeguard
the pro-competitive arena established by the WTO Agreement is
through benchmark settlement rates. 167  The international
settlement process is a system by which U.S. international
switched message providers and their foreign counterparts divide
the proceeds that result from settlement. 68 Settlement payments
are the compensation paid by a carrier in the country where an
international call originates to a carrier in the destination country
for providing switching and routing facilities to deliver the call toits ntened •• .169
its intended recipient. Terms and conditions of the agreement
between the two entities are individually negotiated in an
operating agreement for the provision of service between the two
countries. 7 °
The operating agreement establishes the "accounting rate,"
which represents the per minute charge shared by the two carriers
for completing the call and is often higher than the cost to the
carriers of providing the service.'' The accounting rates determine
the amount of compensation, known as "settlement payments,"
that a carrier in a country where an international call originates
available in 1997 WL 12641400.
165 See Cooper, supra note 150.
166 See id.
167 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 875.
168 See Ahern, supra note 97, at 276.
169 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 904 n.1.
170 See Ahem, supra note 97, at 276.
171 See id.; Harwood, supra note 6, at 898.
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must pay the delivering carrier in the destination country. 172 Since
many more international calls originate in the United States than
terminate here, U.S. carriers routinely make net payments to their
foreign correspondents."' Higher accounting rates increase the
amounts of those payments and also keep prices for international
calls artificially high.
1 4
The international settlements process, which predates the FCC,
has been problematic from the start. 175  It is based on a natural
monopoly model which assumes no competition. 7 1 Under its
Uniform Settlements Policy, the FCC required uniform settlements
for all carriers on parallel international routes for the purpose of
preventing "whipsawing"' 7   of competing U.S. international
carriers." However, in light of the success of domestic pro-
competitive policies during the mid-1980s, the FCC became
concerned that the uniformity requirement would dampen
competitive entry into markets.' 79 In 1986, the FCC began to issue
waivers of the uniform settlement policy; these offers of waiver
were determined on a case-by-case basis after consideration of a
variety of factors. 80
As competition was introduced to the international voice
172 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 898.
173 See id.
174 See id. By FCC estimates, the net payments from the United States to foreign
carriers in 1995 were approximately $5 billion. See id. The portion of those payments
in excess of the cost by the correspondent carrier, an estimated $3.75 billion, represents
a subsidy by U.S. consumers. See id. In addition, the FCC estimates that excessive
accounting rates result in international calling rates that are six times the average for
domestic long distance. See id.
175 See Ahern, supra note 97, at 277.
176 See id.
177 Whipsawing is the practice whereby a monopolist foreign carrier plays
competing U.S. carriers against each other to gain an advantage. See Ahern, supra note
97, at 280.
178 See id. at 279. The U.S. government first began to regulate international
accounting rates in 1937. See Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 2 F.C.C. 592; aff'd en
banc, 4 F.C.C. 150 (1937); affd sub nom Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. FCC, 97
F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1938). In 1936, the FCC first applied the Uniform Settlements
Policy to international voice services. See Ahern, supra note 97, at 280.
179 See Ahern, supra note 97, at 279-80.
"0 See id. at 280.
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services arena and the U.S. billed traffic came to predominate the
market, the FCC's focus changed to reflect growing concern
regarding the serious deficits that result from uneven international
traffic flows and high accounting rates.'8' In 1991, the FCC began
a series of reforms designed to deal with the problems of above-
cost accounting rates.12  For example, the FCC attempted to
include language within the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) recommendations that would clarify that accounting
rates should be both non-discriminatory and cost-based.
3
Further, in November 1992, the FCC set "benchmark" settlement
rates as a guide to U.S. carriers in their negotiations with foreign
carriers. Is4  The benchmark rates represented the FCC's
''conservative estimate of an appropriate range for settlement rates,
based on the underlying costs to terminate international calls."'8 5
U.S. carriers were required to report on the progress made in
negotiating settlement rates within the FCC's benchmark ranges
but these benchmarks were not considered mandatory.'86
More serious action to reform the settlement process by
bringing accounting rates close to the level, that would prevail in a
competitive environment began with a December 1996 order
(Flexibility Order) which provided U.S. carriers with more
flexibility in negotiating operating agreements with their foreign
correspondents.' On routes where competition in the foreign
market is sufficient to eliminate the potential for whipsawing, U.S.
carriers were allowed to negotiate the terms of their agreements
with foreign carriers through individual agreement."' The FCC's
181 See id. at 281.
112 See id. at 282.
183 See id. The ITU is one of the world's longest standing international
organizations with 184 members today. See id. The Telecommunication Sector is
responsible for technical, operating and tariff questions, including accounting and
settlement rates, with a view toward standardizing telecommunications on a global basis.
See id.
184 See id. at 284.
185 Id. at 285 (quoting In the Matter of Regulation of International Accounting
Rates, 7 F.C.C.R. 8040 (1992) (Phase II Second Order and Second Further Notice)).
186 See id. at 285.
187 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 898.
188 See id. at 899.
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aforementioned ECO test was used to determine which routes
would be eligible for flexibility.' 9 Also, the FCC could, at its
discretion, allow flexibility on routes where it would serve to
promote market-oriented pricing as long as there was little risk of
whipsawing.' 9°
Significantly more controversial than the Flexibility Order was
the FCC's proposal in December 1996 to set specific targets for
accounting rates.' 9' This notice announced the FCC's intention to
revise its benchmark ranges for accounting rates to reflect cost
reductions made possible by advances in the technology
surrounding originating and terminating international voice calls.' 92
Further, the FCC suggested several tactics to ensure compliance
with the benchmarks, including conditioning authorizations to
provide U.S. international services on compliance with the
benchmark rates.' 93
Because many lesser-developed countries use the settlement
payments received from U.S. carriers for much needed
infrastructure development, any reform of the accounting rate
regime was certain meet with resistance. '14 The above-cost
accounting rates represent a direct subsidy to the foreign carrier
and, as such, provide a strong disincentive to reduce collection
rates. 195  In addition, advances in technology now allow
circumvention of the settlement process such that the imbalance of
calls has increased disproportionate to the actual traffic
189 See id.
'90 See id.
191 See id.
192 See id. (citing International Settlement Rates (FCC) (proposed Dec. 19, 1996),
available in 1996 WL 738850).
193 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 900. Other suggested ways the FCC proposed to
enforce the benchmarks included the enlistment of the relevant foreign government for
assistance and prohibiting U.S. carriers from settling with the foreign carrier at other
than the benchmark rate until the foreign carrier agrees to cooperate in the negotiations.
See id.
194 See id.
195 See Ahern, supra note 97, at 282. As long as the price for calling to the United
States from those countries remains high, billed traffic will remain low and the disparity
in calling volumes will continue, thus continuing the subsidy. See id.
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imbalance.'96
Not surprisingly, the FCC's proposal launched an
unprecedented wave of opposition from foreign administrations. 97
Many questioned the FCC's jurisdiction to unilaterally impose
pricing rules on international services.98 More than ninety
comments were filed in the proceeding, with both foreign carriers
and their governments urging the FCC to take a multilateral
approach by working with the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU).' 99 However, the FCC was clearly frustrated with
ITU efforts, which dated back more than five years and had failed
to produce results.2 00 Although the ITU had grudgingly conceded
to a need for settlement rates to decrease, there had been no
agreement among members of the group on measures to achieve
that goal.2'
Consequently, at its August 1997 meeting, the FCC adopted an
order to enforce new, stringent benchmarks on the settlement rates
U.S. carriers will pay for the termination of international calls.202
Although the FCC claimed it had modified its December proposal
to reflect the numerous comments it had received, industry
'96 See id. at 291-92. The use of traffic routing schemes, e.g., call-back service and
call reorigination, to avoid the international settlement process or to gain some other
competitive advantage is an increasing problem in the international telecommunications
market. See id.
'9' See FCC Sinks Teeth into U.S. Settlement Deficit, TR INT'L, Aug. 15, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 12641326.
198 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 900.
9 See FCC Puts Pin to International Settlement Bubble, supra note 82.
200 See id.
20 See id.
202 See FCC Sinks Teeth into U.S. Settlement Deficit, supra note 197. The
benchmark settlement rate is set at 15 cents per minute for high-income countries, 19
cents per minute for middle-income countries, 23 cents per minute for lower-income
countries. See id. The FCC based the benchmarks on foreign carriers' publicly
available tariff rates and information published by the ITU. See id.
The order will take effect on January 1, 1998 with the benchmarks themselves
commencing one year later and beginning with the high-income countries on January 1,
1999. See id. The phase-in continues in yearly increments with upper-middle-income
countries on January 1, 2000, lower-middle-income countries on January 1, 2001, and
low-income countries on January 1, 2002. See id. Countries with extremely low
telecommunications service density would have to meet the relevant benchmark by the
year 2003. See id.
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analysts were doubtful that the changes were significant enough to
prevent the numerous judicial appeals and trade actions likely to
follow.2 °3
Also, the FCC offered to refrain from applying the benchmarks
in the new order if the ITU can coordinate an interconnection
agreement before the first benchmarks go into effect on January 1,
1999.04 However, the FCC did not specify what ITU provisions
would be required in order to supersede implementation of the
benchmarks. 05 In addition, many question whether the ITU could
meet the 1999 deadline for a settlement reform plan.0 6
In spite of the widely-acknowledged slow pace of ITU action,
critics restated their opposition to the FCC's plan to set unilateral
benchmarks.' °7 The FCC, for its part, presented estimates that use
of benchmarks could result in savings to consumers of $1.86
billion in 1999 alone.0 8 Outgoing International Bureau Chief
Peter Cowhey predicted those savings would grow to $4.23 billion
in annual savings in the year 2003.209 According to Mr. Cowhey,
the FCC's goal is not to "'micro-manage"' international settlement
rates but rather to force those rates down until they become cost-
oriented.210 From that point, "market dynamics should determine
the [existence of] U.S. surplus or deficit on these payments."2 " I
Several FCC Commissioners pointed to the conclusion of the
WTO Agreement as incentive to move quickly to reform the
international settlement system.1 2 Since carriers from WTO
member nations can use funds from inflated settlement payments
to cross-subsidize their entry into the U.S. market, they would
203 See FCC Sinks Teeth into U.S. Settlement Deficit, supra note 197.
204 See id.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 See id.
208 See id.
209 See FCC Puts Pin to International Settlement Bubble, supra note 82.
210 See id.
211 Id.
212 See id.
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have a sizable cost advantage over U.S. carriers.1 3 That advantage
would be funded primarily by U.S. international service
ratepayers. 24  The benchmark rates are intended to reduce the
potential for such competitive distortions in the market.1 5
As a concession to the comments it received from foreign
governments and carriers, the FCC action will use cost averages as
the basis for the benchmarks, thus allowing foreign carriers to
continue to receive substantial returns from international
operations despite falling rates.1 6 Also, the FCC will proceed with
"extra care" in phasing in the benchmarks for countries with
extremely low telecommunications service penetration (defined as
less than one line per one hundred population).2t 7
Two benchmark-related conditions will be placed on some
authorizations to operate in the United States as safeguards against
competitive distortions.2" The first is designed to prevent a U.S.
carrier who has a foreign affiliate from using the above benchmark
rate revenues of its foreign affiliate to gain an unfair price
advantage over other U.S. carriers.219 Those foreign affiliates will
have to charge a settlement rate to all U.S. carriers at or below the
acceptable benchmark for that route.22 ° In situations where the
FCC detects competitive distortions in the U.S. markets, it will
take enforcement action which could include mandating the
payment of a settlement rate equal to the lowest commercially
viable rate on a competitive international route. 2'
The second safeguard addresses the provision of switched
services using international private lines and is designed to prevent
one-way bypass of the settlement system.12 The FCC will permit
213 See id.
214 See id.
215 See id.
216 See id.
217 Id.
28 See id.
219 See id.
220 See id.
221 See id. Currently, the lowest commercially viable rate is eight cents per minute
on the U.S.-Sweden route. See id.
222 See id.
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a carrier to use its authorization to provide "switched services over
international private lines only if at least half of the traffic on the
route in question is being settled at rates that are at or below the
relevant benchmark."223. Thus, foreign carriers.will be precluded
from sending calls into the United States through private lines in
order to avoid the international accounting rate treatment while
calls terminated in the foreign carrier's home market would
continue to be subject to inflated settlement rates.224  Again, the
FCC promises to take enforcement action in situations where
competitive distortions occur, including suspending service
authorization until at least half of the traffic on the route is settled
at the lowest commercially viable rate. 5
Predictably, criticism of the plan has been widespread. It
began, in fact, prior to the August adoption of the benchmark rates
when ITU chief Pekka Tarjanne warned that unilateral FCC action
on settlement rates would "move the global telecommunications
industry toward catastrophe. 226 The FCC's action appears to have
succeeded, though, in pressuring the ITU to move forward with its
own efforts toward setting similar restrictions.227  Following a
September 1997 announcement by Mr. Tarjanne that the ITU's
study group will produce a "'historic"' document on accounting
rate reform by year-end, the ITU's Study Group 3 (SG-3) drafted a
concrete proposal to cut international accounting rates at its
meeting in Geneva on December 11, 1997.28
The SG-3 proposal calls for a cut in rates by one Special
Drawing Right (SDR) per minute by the end of 1998.29 While the
223 Id.
224 See id.
225 See id.
226 FCC Takes on the International Telecommunications Union to Prevent
Monopolies Exploiting Users, COMPUTERGRAM INT'L, Aug. 11, 1997, available in 1997
WL 11230415.
227 See id.
228 See Bangemann: WTO Case Possible against U.S., TR INT'L, Sept. 12, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 12641402; Susan Carroll Schorr, ITU Group Proposes
Accounting Rate Cuts, TR INT'L, Dec. 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12641651.
229 See Schorr, supra note 228. The SDR fluctuates in value based on a weighted
basket of currencies established by the International Monetary Fund. See id. The value
of the SDR at the time of the SG-3 proposal was $1.35. See id.
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proposal would finally establish a ceiling on settlement rates, the
FCC characterized the proposal as inadequate. The settlement
rates called for by the FCC's August, 1997 order are substantially
less than the ceiling proposed by SG-3. 231 In addition, the SG-3
proposal would permit developing countries to defer cutting their
accounting rates until an agreed-upon target date simply by
identifying "significant difficulties" they might encounter in
complying with the reduction. A further provision of the SG-3
proposal would allow developing countries to negotiate the current
50-50 accounting rate arrangements to compensate for revenue
reductions. The SG-3 proposal, which is considered a transitional
measure while efforts to develop longer term options continue,
must undergo certain ITU procedures before formal adoption in
June 1998.
The SG-3 proposal, if approved by a majority of the ITU-
member countries, could take effect more rapidly than the U.S.
policy adopted in August 1997. The first deadline for attaining the
U.S. benchmarks, which is limited to certain developed countries,
is January 1, 1999, while the SG-3 proposal calls for cuts by the
end of 1998. Nevertheless, an FCC representative at the
December meeting predicted that the SG-3 proposal would not be
sufficient to meet the FCC's challenge to the ITU to enact a
satisfactory settlement reform plan in order to derail
implementation of the FCC benchmarks.232
Other negative reaction to the FCC settlement order has
included a promise by the European Commission to ask a WTO
dispute resolution panel to review the action early next year if the
FCC's order is not changed.233 The European Commission
statement appeared against a backdrop of reported plans by foreign
carriers to appeal the FCC's ruling to a U.S. appeals court.3 4 Also,
it was reported in early September that Japanese-owned KDD
would take legal action against the FCC challenging the FCC's
authority to change the international rules governing settlement
230 See id.
21 See id.
232 See id.
233 See Bangemann: WTO Case Possible Against U.S., supra note 228.
234 See id.
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rates.235
The continuing power of the U.S. telecommunications
marketplace will be a major determinant of the FCC's success in
both the implementation and enforcement of the benchmarks. 236 A
large portion of the revenue foreign carriers receive for terminating
international calls comes from calls originating in the United
States.237  Thus, foreign carriers are dependent on U.S. business
and are unlikely to seriously challenge the FCC order in the short
term.238  However, as the international long distance market
becomes increasingly competitive, limits to the FCC's
enforcement ability may emerge.239 Relying on the success it has
had with the uniform settlements policy since 1986, the FCC
appears committed to press ahead with implementation, using its
market power to leverage a reduction in accounting rates both
bilaterally through the benchmark order and multilaterally via
pressure on the ITU process.240
C. Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S.
Telecommunications Market
The most significant FCC action following the signing of the
WTO Agreement occurred on November 25, 1997 when the
Commission adopted an Order in the Matter of Rules and Policies
on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market
(FCC 97-398).24' This action is the final step in implementing the
market-opening commitments made by the United States under the
WTO accord.24 2  FCC 97-398 allows significant increase in
235 See Analysis - Japan Telecoms Body Sets Lead with U.S. Lawsuit, ASIA PULSE,
Sept. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13562676.
236 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 900.
237 See id.
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 See id.
241 Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market Report and Order,
62 Fed. Reg. 64,741 (1997) [hereinafter FCC 97-398].
242 See Commission Liberalizes Foreign Participation in the U.S.
Telecommunications Market, Unofficial Announcement of Commission Action
(Nov. 25, 1997) (visited Apr. 8, 1998)
<http:://www.fcc.gov/bureaus/intemational/newsreleases/I 997/nrin7O42.txt>. The
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competition in the U.S. telecommunications market by facilitating
market entry and investment by foreign-owned companies.243 The
FCC expects U.S. consumers to benefit from reduced prices,
greater service options, and technological innovation.
2 44
Specifically, the FCC enacted changes to the ECO test and
related rules adopted in the Foreign Carrier Entry proceeding
(FCC 95-475).245 At the time of its adoption, the goals of the ECO
test were to promote competition in the U.S. telecommunications
market, to prevent anti-competitive conduct, and to encourage
other countries to open their markets. 246 FCC 97-398 delivered on
the FCC's promise to revisit the rules, if and when, a WTO
agreement substantially achieving those goals was achieved.247
While the FCC endorsed the WTO pact in principle, it
attempted through FCC 97-398 to balance the dual objectives of
opening the U.S. telecommunications market and thwarting
attempts by either dominant foreign carriers or their U.S. affiliates
to distort competition. 248 Toward that end, included with the
relaxation of the current rules that apply the ECO test for
companies from WTO countries is a controversial provision
retaining FCC authority to deny or condition foreign carrier entry
if required by the public interest.249
The FCC concluded in FCC 97-398 that it no longer needs to
conduct a detailed ECO analysis involving applications under
process began on June 4, 1997, with the release by the FCC of the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S.
Telecommunications Market (NPRM). See Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation
in the U.S. Telecommunications Market, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,966 [hereinafter FCC 97-195].
The NPRM proposed changes to the rules and policies governing foreign participation in
the U.S. market for basic communications services and solicited comments on a number
of related proposals regarding foreign participation in the U.S. basic telecommunications
market. See id. Reaction and official comments to the NPRM are discussed infra notes
268-307 and accompanying text.
243 See FCC 97-398, supra note 241.
244 See id.
245 See id.
246 See IN 97-15, supra note 46.
247 See id.
248 See FCC 97-398, supra note 241; see also FCC Moves to Implement WTO
Agreement, Proposes Easy Market Entry for Foreign Carriers, supra note 101.
249 See FCC 97-398, supra note 241; see also IN 97-15, supra note 46.
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section 214 filed by carriers from WTO member countries seeking
to provide U.S. international service.2 0 The FCC's conclusion was
based on the premise that competition in the U.S. market will be
best served by eliminating the burdensome analysis and replacing
it with streamlined processing of the applications.25 ' Further, FCC
97-398 eliminated the ECO test as part of its section 310(b) public
interest analysis of Title III applications for common carrier radio
licenses filed by carriers with indirect foreign ownership from
WTO countries. 212 Finally, FCC 97-398 concluded that an ECO
test is no longer necessary for authorization of all U.S. carriers to
provide switched services over resold or facilities-based private
lines between the United States and other WTO countries or for
cable landing licenses for submarine cables between the United
253States and other WTO member countries.
However, if the granting of section 214, Title III common
carrier, and cable landing license applications to WTO member
countries is shown to pose a "very high risk to competition" in the
U.S. telecommunications market and that risk can not be dealt
with by the imposition of conditions on the authorization, FCC 97-
254398 would deny the application. Also, although the applications
from WTO member countries will be assumed to serve the public
interest, FCC 97-398 retained authority for the FCC to deny or
condition such entry if required by the public interest.2 55  In
contrast, the FCC did not believe that public interest objectives
would be served by eliminating the existing ECO test for entities
from countries that are not WTO members.256
Since the ECO test is eliminated for section 214 purposes, the
FCC also will eliminate the test as the basis for permitting U.S.
carriers to negotiate alternative settlement arrangements with
250 See FCC 97-398, supra note 241.
251 See id.; IN 97-15, supra note 46.
252 See FCC 97-398, supra note 241.
253 See id.
254 Id.
255 See id.
256 See id. Most notably, China and Russia, as non-'WTO members, will remain
subject to the ECO standard. See Shetty, supra note 49.
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carriers from WTO countries under its Flexibility Order.257
Instead, FCC 97-398 will replace the ECO test with a presumption
in favor of permitting flexibility for carriers.258 To rebut any such
application, there must be a showing that market conditions in the
country in question are not sufficiently competitive to prevent
discrimination against U.S. carriers by a dominant carrier in the
foreign market.259 Again, in this area, FCC 97-398 continues the
use of the ECO test as a threshold standard for permitting
flexibility with carriers that are from non-WTO member
countries.' 60
The FCC safeguards applicable to foreign-affiliated carriers
regulated as dominant on particular U.S. international routes were
211
modified in several ways. The revisions were tailored to
address competitive concerns but not to pose an undue burden on
the foreign-affiliated carrier.262 The safeguards apply to dominant
foreign-affiliated carriers depending on the risk of competitive
263harm the carrier poses. Where a U.S. carrier is affiliated with a
foreign carrier who has market power in a destination country
subject to competition from multiple international facilities-based
competitors, basic dominant carrier regulations consisting of a
minimal set of safeguards apply.264  Supplemental safeguards
providing for greater oversight apply to foreign carriers with
market power in a destination country that cannot meet this
standard.26 ' These supplemental safeguards include compliance
with stricter limits on joint marketing, including the sharing of
foreign market telephone customer information and the steering of
257 See IN 97-15, supra note 46; see also FCC 97-398, supra note 241.
258 See FCC 97-398, supra note 241.
259 See id.
260 See id.
261 See id.; IN 97-15, supra note 46. U.S. carriers are classified as dominant
carriers on an international route where they are affiliated with a foreign carrier that has
market power in the destination country. See id.
262 See id.
263 See id.; FCC 97-398, supra note 241.
264 See id.; see also IN 97-15, supra note 46.
265 See FCC 97-398, supra note 241.
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customers by the foreign carrier to the affiliated U.S. carrier.166
Requirements for prior approval to add circuits on an affiliated
route and to require carriers to file quarterly circuit status reports
also were adopted .
Reaction to FCC 97-398 began in June 1997, when publication
of the much-awaited NPRM provoked significant public outcry
along with numerous official comments from foreign carriers and
governments. While the response was overwhelmingly positive to
the proposed elimination of the ECO test in most applications
made by WTO member countries, the controversy centered on the
belief by some foreign carriers that the FCC's application of a
non-ECO public interest analysis was an attempt to preserve
reciprocity standards. 6 ' Foreign carrier protest focused on the
U.S. insistence on retaining: a) its right to determine whether a
foreign carriers market entry would pose a grave risk to
competition in the United States; and b) the executive branch's
ability to consider concerns about national security, trade, and
foreign policy issues in making a "public interest" evaluation of a
foreign carrier application. 69 Also, particular attention was given
to the proposed link between the NPRM and the FCC's separate
proposal, and subsequent Order, on accounting rate benchmarks
which was also criticized widely outside the United States.27°
Not surprisingly, since both the KDD and NTT applications"'
were still suspended when the NPRM was released, Japan was
quick to voice its concerns. The Japanese government noted the
inclusion of trade concerns and the FCC's continued right to
deflect risks to competition as areas where the FCC would have
too much latitude to arbitrarily exercise its power."' KDD pointed
266 See id; IN 97-15, supra note 46.
267 See FCC 97-398, supra note 241; see also IN 97-15, supra note 46.
268 See Foreign Carriers Want FCC's ECO To Fade Away, supra note 134.
269 See Foreign Carriers, Governments Say FCC Falls Short On WTO
Commitments; U.S. Carriers Want Firmness, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REP., July 14,
1997, available in 1997 WL 7757986.
270 See FCC Moves To Implement WTO Agreement, Proposes Easy Market Entry
for Foreign Carriers, supra note 101.
271 See supra notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
272 See Foreign Carriers, Governments Say FCC Falls Short On WTO
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specifically to its pending application on which consideration was
held up on the basis of trade policy concerns as an example of why
it considered the NPRM's remaining restrictions particularly
troubling.273 NTT recognized the NPRM's reservation of the right
to restrict market entry based on national security and law
214
enforcement concerns. However, it reiterated the concerns of
both the government and KDD regarding restrictions based on
foreign policy and trade matters.
Initial reaction from European-based carriers, while
applauding the decision to drop the ECO test for most applications
by WTO member nations, was also heavily critical of the
remainder of the proposal. Deutsche Telekom AG accused the
United States of adding new restrictions under the guise of public
interest which would be in violation of both the WTO Agreement
and the GATS.276  It challenged the United States to join with
Germany and most European Union member countries to
implement the WTO Agreement without reserving the right to
277
regulate market entry of foreign carriers.
France Telecom S.A. responded by urging the United States
not to attempt to "claw back" the commitments made under the
WTO Agreement.278 It requested assurance from the FCC that the
proposed public interest consideration would not become an
evaluation method incompatible with the most-favored nation and
national treatment principles of the Agreement.279
Telefonica Internacional de Espana S.A. voiced its concern
that the FCC will condition market entry on compliance with
proposed international settlement rate benchmarks. 8 ° Cable &
Commitments; U.S. Carriers Want Firmness, supra note 269.
273 See id.
274 See id.
275 See id.
276 See id.
277 See id.
278 Id.
279 See id.
280 See id. Concern about the proposed link between authorizations for
interconnected private line services to compliance with the proposed settlement rate
benchmarks was also voiced outside the European Union, most notably from the
Telecommunications Authority of Singapore. See id.
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Wireless plc, based in Great Britain, concluded that the NPRM, if
implemented, would make it impossible for foreign carriers to
compete on a full scale in the United States."' BT North America,
Inc. charged the United States to adopt regulatory policies that
assume participants will comply with the WTO Agreement."' It
suggested that a more effective approach would be to adopt
meaningful sanctions against carriers displaying anti-competitive
behavior once they are operating in the U.S. market.283
By early August 1997, the European carriers' protest had
reached the European Commission (EC) who issued a warning to
the FCC that the NPRM risked violation of the WTO's principles
governing market access.284 The EC's response focused on both
the continued use of factors such as law enforcement, trade
concerns, and foreign policy to determine whether a foreign carrier
should be allowed entry into the U.S. market and also on the
ability of the United States to refuse a license to applicants who
.. . 285
pose a very high risk to competition. Further, the EC questioned
the need for more stringent safeguards for those U.S. carriers
affiliated with foreign dominant carriers.286
Following the lead of foreign carriers from the European
Union member states, the EC presented comments regarding the
NPRM to the FCC, requesting the U.S. agency to reconsider the
proposal. In its formal response, the EC reserved the right for
the European Union and its member states to challenge the NPRM
draft rules within the WTO dispute resolution framework. 88
Meanwhile, U.S. based carriers filed comments expressing
their own concerns that the FCC had not done enough to protect
their interests by guaranteeing that foreign markets would be open
21 See id.
282 See id.
283 See id.
284 See European Commission: FCC Breached WTO in Market-Entry Proposals,
supra note 121.
285 See id.
286 See id.
287 See Smith, supra note 9.
288 See id.
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to them.289  AT&T voiced strong resistance to the NPRM's
abandonment of safeguards against anti-competitive conduct,
noting that of the nearly seventy countries that signed the WTO
Agreement, no more than twenty of their commitments would
meet the ECO test when the Agreement took effect.2 90 MCI urged
the FCC to maintain the link between market entry and
compliance with proposed international settlement rate
benchmarks.29' WorldCom, Inc. opposed the rebuttable
presumption model for section 214 facilities and cable landing
license applications. It cited the need for the FCC to retain
discretion to respond in situations where the foreign carrier's home
country has no real market liberalization.2 92 Frontier Corp echoed
these sentiments.2
Speaking on behalf of the local exchange carriers (LECs), the
U.S. Telephone Association stated that the easing of conditions for
foreign carrier market entry should result in the LECs also being
allowed to enter all domestic U.S. telecommunications markets. 94
BellSouth agreed, saying that "[i]t would be irrational for the
Commission to adopt a formal presumption in favor of foreign
entry ... while continuing to deny the Bell companies a chance to
enter the domestic interexchange market, even when they show
their local markets are in fact open. '295 U.S. West, Inc. suggested
the FCC should continue to use the ECO test until the January 1,
1998 effective date of the WTO Agreement in order to encourage
foreign governments to open their markets.296 Ameritech proposed
289 See Foreign Carriers Want FCC's ECO to Fade Away, supra note 134.
290 See Foreign Carriers, Governments Say FCC Falls Short On WTO
Commitments; U.S. Carriers Want Firmness, supra note 269.
291 See id. MCI further proposed that the authorization for market entry be
conditioned on achievement of settlement rates at the low end of the proposed
benchmark range. See id.
292 See id.
293 See id.
294 See id.
295 Comments of Bell South Corporation, In the Matter of Rules and Policies on
Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market (last modified July 9,
1997) <ftp://ftp.fcc.gov/pubs/bureaus/international/comments/ib97142com.zip>.
296 See Foreign Carriers, Governments Say FCC Falls Short On WTO
Commitments; U.S. Carriers Want Firmness, supra note 269.
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a replacement of the ECO test with a review of whether the home
countries of foreign competitors who apply for entry to U.S.
markets have allowed multiple-carrier entry into their own
domestic markets.297
GTE Corporation was alone in voicing concerns similar to
those of the foreign carriers. It agreed with the FCC that care
should be taken to prevent competitive distortions by foreign
carriers.298 However, it urged the FCC to strike an appropriate
balance between U.S. market protection and the opening of foreign
markets, citing the risk that overzealous U.S. protection would
result in countermeasures by foreign countries.299
Reflecting somewhat different concerns, U.S. wireless carriers
urged the FCC to allow increased foreign investment as quickly as
possible.3°° NextWave Personal Communications, Inc. urged the
FCC to begin implementation of its commitment under the WTO
Agreement to eliminate restrictions on indirect investment in
wireless licensees.3°' Other endorsements of relaxing the
application of section 310's foreign ownership restrictions came
from FaciliCom International LLC, WinStar Communications,
Inc., Shell Offshore Services Co., and Telephone and Data
Systems, Inc.' °2
U.S. government agencies gave mixed responses in their
comments to the NPRM. The Office of the USTR supported the
FCC's right to analyze the effect market entry will have on
competition-regarding both U.S. telecommunications carriers
under existing telecommunications regulation and foreign entrants
under the newly proposed rules.3°3
Comments from two other executive agencies reflected
concern about the rebuttable presumption framework.3 04  The
297 See id.
298 See id.
299 See id.
"0 See Foreign Carriers Want FCC's ECO to Fade Away, supra note 134.
30l See id.
302 See id.
303 See Foreign Carriers, Governments Say FCC Falls Short On WTO
Commitments; U.S. Carriers Want Firmness, supra note 269.
'04 See id.
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Secretary of Defense stated that a presumption that market entry is
in the public interest should not apply to national security issues,
adding that such issues should be "affirmatively resolved before an
application from a foreign-affiliated carrier is granted."3 5
Similarly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation stated that the FCC
must defer to determinations made by executive branch agencies
regarding national security or law enforcement issues.' °6
By the close of the official comment period, the FCC had
received comments from forty-seven parties, including fourteen
foreign telecommunications carriers.0 7 Most of the negative
response to the NPRM stemmed from the public interest hurdle
that must be overcome before authorization to enter the U.S.
market is granted.0 8 As noted in the discussion of the NTT and
KDD applications,309 this position clearly leaves the United States
with an effective tool to exert implied bilateral pressure through
the aggressive scrutiny of applications that present a risk of
anticompetitive conduct.
310
Although FCC 97-398 acknowledged the comments received,
it did not back away from the public interest analysis.3 '
Throughout the WTO negotiations, the FCC maintained the
position that the United States has the right under WTO rules to
protect its national interests, including the promotion of
competition and national security.3"2 The NPRM went a step
further in asserting that the WTO accord obligates the FCC to
305 Comments of the Secretary of Defense, In the Matter of Rules and Policies on
Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market (last modified July 9,
1997) <ftp://ftp.fcc.gov/pubs/bureaus/international/comments/ib97142com.zip>.
306 See id.
307 See FCC 97-398, supra note 241.
308 See FCC Adopts Rules for Easier Access to U.S. Market, Claims Compliance
with U.S. Commitments in WTO Pact, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPS, Dec. 1, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 7759218 [hereinafter FCC Adopts Rules for Easier Access to U.S.
Market].
309 See supra notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
310 See Harwood, supra note 6, at 902.
311 See FCC 97-398, supra note 241; FCC Adopts Rules for Easier Access to U.S.
Market, supra note 308.
311 See FCC Moves to Implement WTO Agreement, Proposes Easy Market Entry for
Foreign Carriers, supra note 101.
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"maintain measures to prevent anticompetitive conduct." '313 In
announcing FCC 97-398 in November 1997, the newly-installed
Commission vigorously defended the safeguards by stating that
the public interest analysis for both foreign and domestic service
providers is mandated by the Communications Act of 1934. 3' 4
Thus, failure to apply the public interest standard to foreign
carriers would have the effect of granting them more favorable
treatment than U.S. carriers receive."'
However, the Commissioners repeatedly emphasized that the
public interest test will be invoked very rarely to deny or condition
applications for entry into the U.S. market by carriers from WTO
member countries. 16 In addition, the Commissioners attempted to
assure foreign governments and, in particular, the EC, that the
FCC will retain its independence from the Executive Branch.317
Many industry observers seemed willing to take the FCC at its
word, deferring judgment on the new rules pending the outcome of
their implementation.31 Whether the FCC's assurances will be
sufficient to dissuade the EC from proceeding with its threatened
action at the WTO remains to be seen.319 EC officials held open
the option that they may still seek action while they scrutinized the
FCC's order to determine whether all their concerns have been
satisfactorily addressed.32°
The final impediment to implementation of FCC 97-398
concerned its interrelationship with the WTO Agreement. 2'
Because the January 1, 1998 date for the WTO Agreement to enter
313 FCC 97-195, supra note 242.
314 See FCC Adopts Rules for Easier Access to U.S. Market, supra note 308.
315 See id.
316 See id. FCC officials characterized the public interest test as a narrow one aimed
at specific law enforcement, national security or foreign or trade policy concerns. See
FCC Opens U.S. Telecom and Satellite Markets to Foreign Competition, COMM. DAILY,
Nov. 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13781003.
317 See FCC Opens U.S. Telecom and Satellite Markets to Foreign Competition,
supra note 316.
3"8 See id.
319 See id.
320 See id.
321 See WTO Implementation Still Adrift; FCC Reassures Industry on Rules,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPS, Jan. 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 8485414.
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into force had been delayed pending resolution of the outstanding
ratifications of a handful of signatories,322 there was also some
question as to when FCC 97-398 would take effect.323 The FCC
would not formally commit to implement its new rules prior to
official commencement of the WTO accord.3 24  However, shortly
after the official declaration of the February 5, 1998
implementation date for the WTO Agreement, the FCC released
an order confirming that its rules would go into effect February 9,
1998.121 Ironically, since the United States had held up
implementation of the entire WTO Agreement in order to force
some countries to meet the ratification deadline,326 this left one
business day when the WTO pact was in effect without official
U.S. compliance."' More significantly, the implementation of
FCC 97-398 with the public interest safeguards intact marks the
preservation by the United States of an important resource in its
foreign trade arsenal.
IV. Conclusion
As implementation of the WTO Agreement commences, the
United States continues to reiterate its support for the Agreement's
goals of increased competition and independent regulation.
Although the FCC recently saw a turnover of all but one of its
Commissioners, the new members unanimously adopted FCC 97-
398, indicating continued support for the open-market principles
of the previous Commission. The FCC's new chief of its
International Bureau, Regina Keeney, assumed office with a
pledge that "her staff is ready to throw open the doors to the U.S.
322 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
323 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
324 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
325 See With 57 Countries On Board, WTO Picks Feb. 5 Telecom Pact Start Date,
supra note 64.
326 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
327 See With 57 Countries On Board, WTO Sets Feb. 5 Telecom Pact Start Date,
supra note 64. In a further ironic twist, the Commission explained the February 9 date
by pointing to domestic intergovernmental approvals required. See id. The orders,
adopted in late November 1997, had to first undergo congressional review mandated by
the Contract with America Advancement Act prior to enactment. See id. Also, the new
rules had to be approved by the Office of Management and Budget. See id.
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telecom market under the historic WTO agreement.
Although the change in FCC leadership and the global outcry
surrounding U.S. actions in recent months could impact the U.S.
implementation strategy, there are no strong indications to that
effect. The methodology adopted by the United States, as
exemplified by the three recent FCC 'actions analyzed in this
Comment, appears to be successful, albeit unpopular
internationally. The use of bilateral pressure through the retained
public interest hurdle of FCC 97-398 will likely be effective on a
prospective basis in exacting compliance with the pro-competitive
goals of the WTO Agreement. In addition, the ability of the
United States to condition licensing approvals on adherence to its
recently published benchmark settlement rates will provide
perhaps an even stronger bilateral weapon in the market
liberalization arsenal. And, as long as these weapons are being
used to foster the goals set forth by the Agreement-increased
competition and independent regulation-they are not likely to
face real resistance either bilaterally or though a WTO panel.
Because the United States currently dominates the global
telecommunications market, it can use its market power as
effectively under the WTO Agreement as it has in recent months
on a bilateral basis. However, as more foreign carriers enter the
global market, the U.S. power to exert control will necessarily
diminish and the real test of U.S. commitment to market
liberalization will occur. Meanwhile, as applications pour into the
FCC in response to the implementation of the WTO Agreement,
the goal of a Global Information Infrastructure no longer seems
light years away.
PAULA BARNES SOURS
328 Keeney Says FCC Is Set to Implement WTO Telecom Deal, COMM. TODAY, Nov.
19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13697176.
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